Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 37A is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. Clause 31 of the Bill provides that,

“Except so far as this Part or regulations under this Part provide, nothing … confers a right of action in any civil proceedings in respect of a contravention of a requirement imposed by … this Part”.


It then goes on to say that that subsection

“does not affect any right of action which exists apart from the provisions of this Part”.

I was quite confused by that clause, and relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, also sought clarity. Our amendment would provide that:

“Nothing in this Act or regulations made under it affects any right of action in civil proceedings”.


If we have interpreted the provision correctly, that is a rather more straightforward way of saying it.

When the point was raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the lack of time meant that we did not have the opportunity then to discuss the clause in detail. He said there would be opportunities in due course, so I am taking this opportunity. My question is, quite straightforwardly: does the amendment express what the Government are seeking to say, particularly with regard to breach of statutory duty? If it is not as the amendment sets out, why not? I beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to act as junior counsel to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened carefully to some comments that the Minister made on Monday, which alluded to this clause, and I thought about them carefully, but they were brief and I, too, wish to test what is really intended by the Government. My feeling is that the Government have made an inadvertent mistake in Clause 31 which they can easily rectify.

This Bill is designed to protect citizens by imposing clear statutory duties. When clear statutory duties are imposed and there is a breach of those duties, it is very common for a citizen who is a victim of that breach to be able to bring a civil action. The purpose of the civil action is often to recover damages, though it may involve other declaratory judgments too.

I want to give a few examples, because I think we are going to have one substantive debate on this clause and then a decision will be reached. I am going to mention a number of instances in which breach of statutory duty gives rise to a civil action to obtain judgments of the kind I mentioned. First, driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition gives rise to a statutory duty which can result in a judgment for damages. In this Bill we are talking about something much bigger in scale than driving a vehicle in an unsafe condition, but it may have exactly the same consequences.

There are other examples. If there are unsafe systems or means of work in any workspace, there can be an action for breach of statutory duty without it being necessary to prove negligence, nuisance or any other tort —civil wrong—that requires specific proof of certain aspects. Allowing a vehicle to be driven by an uninsured person allows a claim for breach of statutory duty. The failure to arrange compulsory insurance for employees allows such a claim. If a landlord fails to provide habitable standards, equally, there can be such a claim. If a company fails to disclose required financial information to investors, there can be such a claim for breach of statutory duty.

If a shop sells faulty electrical equipment whereby a fire is caused in the home for which it has been bought, for example, one does not have to prove negligence. One may have an action under the Sale of Goods Acts or their equivalent, but there is an opportunity to obtain damages for breach of statutory duty. At a construction site, the failure to provide safety barriers gives rise to such an action. If we go to a restaurant and suffer food poisoning because it has failed to reach the statutory hygiene standards, we can make a claim for damages for breach of statutory duty. If one fails as an employer to provide proper training to employees on handling hazardous chemicals, that too gives rise to a potential claim for breach of statutory duty. I have chosen just a few examples—and there are others—where one does not have to prove negligence and the components of negligence.

Such provisions are all designed to secure protection for individuals without the need to prove those other elements of common-law civil wrongs. I do not understand why those rights are removed by Clause 31(1). I invite the Government to reflect on what is, as I have suggested, probably an inadvertent failure.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord will have realised from the last debate, my noble friend and I are rather keen on accreditation of training—I will come back to that in a moment—but I should make it clear that we should not be using the term “kitemark”; I know I always do. Apparently, that is the term used by the British Standards Institution for products—as I discovered a while ago when I got this wrong in another context.

Accreditation of training is not quite the same as accreditation of the trainer or the provider. I am a little confused about some of this amendment: the terms “accredited” and “certified” are both used, and I do not know whether it is intended that there is a difference between them. When the noble Lord winds up this debate, perhaps he could tell us—that may be something or nothing.

I had written down, “Is this delegation of responsibility or liability?” The noble Lord just talked about sharing liability, but I do think that that is the direction that the Bill is going or should go in. I find quite a lot of difficulties with this amendment, although there are points where our thinking coincides. As it stands, I do not think we could wholly support it.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has been very careful in the drafting of this amendment and I respect the work he has done, although, like the noble Baroness, I do not agree with the amendment. It seems to undermine the fundamental purpose of the Bill, which is to place responsibility on those people who control premises. To create a box-ticking exercise of this kind, which is what it would amount to, would simply facilitate the payment of an annual subscription and leave it to some other company to take that responsibility.

The noble Lord will be aware, I am sure, that, when somebody employs an independent contractor to carry out part of the work they are contracted to do—for example, a floor layer to do part of a construction contract—the person who engages that independent contractor has at least a common-law responsibility to ensure that they take reasonable steps to ensure that the independent contractor is competent and does the work properly. This amendment would appear to remove that potential responsibility. All of us who have been involved in cases involving questioning the work of independent contractors will know that sometimes such claims can be successful because the employer has not carried out proper scrutiny of the independent contractor.

I also draw to the House’s attention paragraph 8.106 of Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 1: Security for the Arena. Sir John Saunders recommended that

“consideration is given to amending the SIA legislation to require that companies which carry out security work which may include a counter terrorism element are required to be licensed”.

He recommended, therefore,

“that only fit and proper companies carry out this work”,

under an amended SIA licensing procedure similar to the procedure that the SIA already operates for security companies carrying out door security work and similar activities. If the aim of the Bill is, as I believe, to place clear responsibility on those who operate property to take reasonable steps to secure the public against terrorist acts, that responsibility should not be shuffled aside by an amendment of this kind.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Committee stage
Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we are with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on this. If the market to which he is referring is the one I am thinking of, dispersing people from that site would be very difficult, with a bloody great rock and a castle in the way.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for his support of my amendment, but I am afraid I am going to question one part of his amendment. The section in the Building Act 1984 refers to a

“permanent or temporary building, and … any other structure or erection”,

including

“a vehicle, vessel … aircraft or … movable object”—

there is mention in the section of hovercraft. I find it difficult to see how this would be quite the right reference for the Bill.

We have Amendment 20 in this group, which seeks to take out the reference to “immediate vicinity”, and is a probing amendment. This would mean that the objective would not include reducing the risk if an act of terrorism occurs in the immediate vicinity of premises or an event. That is not what we are aiming to achieve; we are aiming to understand, and allow interested organisations to understand, what “immediate vicinity” means. A lot of organisations that briefed us are concerned about this; owners and operators want to comply with the law, take all reasonable steps and do the right thing, but they are not quite sure what that means.

We have heard about grey space, which is the public space outside a building where, by definition, event organisers and security personnel have no control, and only the police can control them—for instance, an area where people queue on a pavement to enter premises but are outside neighbouring premises, or queues which cross over one another.

I assume that the words

“so far as is reasonably practicable”

are the key to what immediate vicinity means in any given situation. Does that phrase mean only what is physically practicable, as a matter of physical layout and the scope for protective measures, or where it is appropriate for an owner to control what goes on, or is it also what is financially practicable, and is that related to the scale of an event or the activities taken over a period as a whole, or to the financial position of an owner of operator? The Explanatory Notes say that what is reasonably practicable is to put in place particular procedures, but I am not quite sure that that answers the point.

It strikes me that what is in the immediate vicinity of any building may affect insurance issues, such as the premium payable by the owner or whether a claim by an owner is met by insurers.

As well as the Minister clarifying the point today, if he is able to, can he tell us whether the Home Office has considered the need for guidance, perhaps with examples of what is in the immediate vicinity? However, as I typed that, I thought that that could be confusing, because if an example is not there then people may think that it would not apply. What help can the Home Office give, or ensure that the Security Industry Authority gives, to help the assessment of whether an area is within the immediate vicinity of premises?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will deal with Amendments 3 and 20; I do not wish to say anything about Amendment 2.

So far as Amendment 3 is concerned, I am sure we have all attended many events that have taken place in large, demountable premises. It is a long time since I have been to the International Eisteddfod in Llangollen, but certainly the last time I attended the arena was a demountable premises—I would have called it a building—that could be packed up on lorries, taken away and stored somewhere. We have all been to sporting events in premises like that. It is a bit of a puzzle to me as to why, in Clause 2(2), the Government diluted the word “premises” by referring to buildings in Clause 2(2)(a). I urge the Government to consider, before Report, putting a definition of premises and/or buildings in the interpretation section at Clause 33. It is my belief that, subject to whatever decision we reach in your Lordships’ Committee about the number of people attending an event which brings those premises within this Bill, we need to include demountable premises.

I turn next to Amendment 20. I mean it when I say that anything that the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee or Lady Suttie, say, I treat with great seriousness, having known them for a very long time. When I hear the noble Baronesses say something together then I treat it with even more respect. However, I have looked at their amendment, alongside Clause 5(2). I urge the Government to consider whether their amendment dilutes the effect of this Bill, rather than achieves their aims—and I do not wish that to happen.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I will respond to that very quickly, because I was waiting for the “but”. It is a probing amendment. I looked for ways to introduce the concept of immediate vicinity in order to question it, and this was the first time where I could do so. I hoped that that would be clear. I certainly am not seeking to dilute the Bill, merely to seek clarity.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I understand and accept what the noble Baroness was attempting, but Clause 5(2) refers to

“if an act of terrorism were to occur on the premises, at the event or in the immediate vicinity of the premises or event”.

To me, that seems to fulfil all requirements.